Non-Governmental Armed Forces : A Commentary on the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Private Military Companies

Introduction

It has become abundantly and verifiably apparent that Britain’s armed forces are simply too small to perform the tasks set by the elected national political leadership.  Furthermore, increasingly serious recruitment and retention problems suggest that, even if the necessary funds, equipment and industrial backing are available, the situation will not improve and gives every sign of continuing to deteriorate.

Given the current situation and taking account recent social, political and economic changes in Britain, two solutions suggest themselves when considering the urgently required increment:-

Non-Governmental Armed Forces (NGF) : Non-State Actors [Private Military Companies (PMCs)]

Non-National Armed Forces : Sub-State Actors [Scots/Welsh/Northerners/Cornish/Shetlanders/etc.]

Non-Governmental Forces form the subject of discussion of the HoC FAC Report, and will therefore form the subject of this dissertation.

Non-National Armed Forces are, to judge by the lack of public information, clearly a major (if not the major) taboo subject of British political discourse, and will not therefore be discussed further at this point.

Before continuing further, some consideration should be given to how the national political authorities regard Britain’s population at large.  The last sentence of Paragraph 18 of the Report makes explicit reference to the large-scale recruitment of British citizens by al-Qaeda and associated organisations.

The author, speaking as someone who was exposed to radical Islamic material as long ago as Autumn 1979, and who has suffered personally as a result of Governmental incompetence, finds this deeply offensive.  It is to be hoped that this statement is not representative of Parliamentary and Governmental thinking.

This dissertation is based on the author’s own abstraction from, and commentary upon, the Report.  All those who disagree with it are more than welcome to procure their own copy of the Report and use it as the basis of their own offerings.

Authorisation & Accountability

Paragraph 35 of the Report refers to establishing a prohibition on armed combat operations, and Paragraph 37 of the Report refers to the Government choosing to prohibit participation in combat operations by PMCs.  While it is laudable, and indeed may be expected, to emphasise the peaceful “public administration” roles of PMCs, in view of the magnitude of the threats (see later), such a blanket ban would place both lives and hard-to-replace and expensive equipment at unjustified risk.

Paragraph 41, on the other hand, takes a much more constructive attitude.  An Oath of Allegiance (even if it only amounts to a commitment to torture no-one and to steal only from those who can afford it) should be sworn, and that Non-Governmental Forces should:-

•	Be subject to a military legal code.

•	Have a known command-and-control structure.

•	Be subject to the Geneva Convention and be accountable for their conduct.

Paragraph 41 quite rightly argues for a regulatory regime, compliant with the existing international instruments, providing enough checks and balances built around legislation similar to the Armed Forces Act, implementing a manual of military law and other legal balances, as applied to the Governmental military.

Paragraph 44 of the Report argues that international legal instruments, including the International Criminal Court, should apply to PMCs as well as the Governmental (national) armed forces.  The author strongly agrees with this, if only to prevent legal challenges delaying and disabling the proposed Non-Governmental Forces (NGF) concept.

Paragraphs 51 to 54 inclusive of the Report deal with economic exploitation, using mineral concessions as an example.  To solutions suggest themselves : properly-accountable funding (see below) and a clause in any Non-Governmental Forces Act stating that mineral concessions and other forms of non-monetary payment revert to HM Government.

Paragraphs 55 and 56 deal with what the Report calls “a vested interest in conflict”.  The solution to this appears to be to orient any proposed NGF organisation towards a vested interest in sound public administration.  The evidence brought before the Committee deals with this concept in some detail.

Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the Report consider the “human rights” aspect.  Any regulatory mechanism would clearly have to allow examination of recruitment procedures.   Any licensed PMCs, other than a NGF organisation, would need, as part of their licences, to guarantee that they would not employ criminals and other unsuitable individuals (‘lunatics’ and ‘perverts’) if they are to operate from the United Kingdom.

The Committee is doubtful that the checks and balances that apply to national armed forces could be applied with equivalent strength to PMC employees.  Furthermore, there is the problem of PMCs committing human rights abuses if they, both individually and collectively will not be “found out”.

These questions, and indeed the whole question of regulation, could be answered by a suitable-drafted Non-Governmental Forces Act and accompanying body of non-governmental military law based on Queen’s Regulations.  Enforcement would be through the UK Courts, European Court and International Criminal Court.  One may rest assured that the international media would form a self-financing body of rigorous investigators!

Paragraph 67 of the Report summarises the Committee’s conclusions in this area.  Should any of the consultancy and/or professional services firms become involved in the Non-Governmental Forces concept, they should insist that the NGF and its smaller PMC associates are professional, responsible and well-regulated, with a primary emphasis being on helping weak but legitimate governments to secure their revenue streams.

Paragraphs 74 and 75 of the Report deal with “double standards”.  The way round this is to incorporate into any NGF Act the powers to track NGF and PMC personnel and hold them accountable for their actions, which ought to act as a powerful deterrent to illegal behaviour.  Furthermore, regulation which ensured the employment of the most well-qualified personnel available would encourage responsible non-governmental military organisations in general, and help to eliminate disreputable organisations.

Paragraphs 77 to 82 inclusive of the Report give some ideas on Rules of Engagement.  To begin with, any Non-Governmental Forces Act would need to ensure that any operation by the NGF, a British PMC, or a combination of the two, would be in accordance with the United Kingdom’s overall foreign and defence policy objectives.

Another legislative objective should be to lead to closer understanding between national governments and/or international bodies (particularly the UN) and the private security sector.

One way of doing this would be to have the NGF act as a ‘buffer’ between the political bodies and the PMCs.  A further legislative objective would be to put down ‘in writing’ the relationship between the Governmental and Non-Governmental/Private sectors, and thereby facilitate technical co-operation and interoperability.

Paragraphs 81 & 82 of the Report, which deal with the UK’s liability for rescuing failed PMC operations, imply an interesting revenue stream for the NGF.  PMC’s, whether British or not, sometimes undertake high-risk activities in unstable circumstances.  Clearly, if such operations go sour, the PMC concerned would have to be extracted from what amounts to a ‘war zone’.  The analogy used in the Report is the NHS ‘rescuing’ botched ‘private’ surgical operations.

The concept the author has in mind is to charge such PMCs what amounts to “get you out of there insurance”.  This could, in effect, be mandated by putting an ‘insurance’ clause in any Non-Governmental Forces Act, along with the declaration that HM Government would not be liable for the extraction of PMC personnel.  The latter would prevent any complicated and expensive extraction operations by Governmental Forces.  Whether any non-British PMCs would avail themselves of such an offer remains to be seen.

Potential NGF and Regulated Sector

Paragraphs 83 to 101 inclusive of the Report summarise the benefits of an aggregate NGF/PMC sector.  These roles are as follows:-

•	Support to weak but legitimate governments

•	Support to international peace operations

•	Support for humanitarian operations

•	Relief to the United Kingdom’s overstretched armed forces
Support to weak but legitimate Governments

This aspect is dealt with in Paragraph 84 of the Report.  States are supposed to have a duty to ensure the security of their citizens and maintain order.  In practice, this ‘law’ is honoured more in the breach than the observance. There are many parts of the world where democratic states face anti-democratic/criminal forces strong enough to bring them down.

Where there is not the ability or the willingness of ‘normal’ regional or international organisations to effectively assist, such states have a moral right to appeal for help from NGF or PMC sources in maintaining public order, the rule of law and an absence of violence over their territories.
Support to International Peace Operations

This aspect is covered in Paragraphs 95-95 inclusive.  The operation most often quoted in this area is the United Nations.  PMCs already provide services in the form of de-mining, guarding and logistics support.  However, the difficulties the UN continues to face in its peacekeeping and conflict solution requires something more substantial.  The author spent a considerable period considering how to deal with the problems detailed in these Paragraphs, within the NGF/PMC concept.

The conclusion reached was a method of establishing a permanent UN Military Contingent.  Clearly, this would have to have the skills, equipment, logistics, command-and-control, mobility and short reaction time necessary to do the job.

Relatively impoverished UN members have long been eager to supply personnel to UN operations, rightly seeing these as a source of ‘hard’ currency.  The first stage in the solution would be to approach certain such countries, whose citizens have in the past shown an unusual degree of initiative, ingenuity and courage, with a view to their participating in a standing UN military.  Bangladesh, Paraguay and Uzbekistan come to mind.

The role of the British NGF/PMC sector would be to provide modern equipment, consumables and training, with a view to producing a force which is highly trained, thoroughly well-used to working together and extremely well equipped.  Also, initially, the British NGF/PMC sector would have to provide commanders, and probably maintenance technicians for a longer period.  The principles would be exactly the same as in the British military operations in Oman circa 1970 onwards.

The main problems will be with Mandates and Rules Of Engagement.  Rigorous UN peacekeeping of the sort under consideration will uncover a ‘right can of worms’; i.e., UN members assaulting other UN members.  Three examples that spring to mind are the “bushwhacking” of UNIFIL by the Israelis in 1982, the French Government’s role in the Rwandan disaster and the Liberian “government” role in the Sierra Leone civil war.  These three governments, and no doubt many others, will violently object to rigorous UN peacekeeping – but it has got to be done!
Support to Humanitarian Organisations

This issue is covered by Paragraph 96 of the Report.  In the absence of effective efforts by national governments, there would appear to be a definitive role for the NGF in supporting humanitarian operations such as those run by the major British charities, where the environment can be delicately be described as ‘unstable’.

One obvious example is airlifts.  Normally speaking, humanitarian organisations would expect to employ civil air cargo operators for their airlift needs.  However, in the current security environment, insurance rates have, quite literally, skyrocketed, to the point where civil air cargo aircraft flying into areas that are considered even slightly “unstable” are beyond the means of even the larger relief charities.

In this case, a non-governmental air arm, or even a PMC operator willing to carry their own insurance risk, would provide not only guaranteed delivery, but a cheaper rate(!).
Relief to the United Kingdom’s overstretched Armed Forces

This is covered by Paragraphs 97 to 101 inclusive of the Report.  The problem here seems to stem from the idea that Britain’s national political leadership seems to regard the Armed Forces as the only really reliable and competent public servants.  There is nothing new in this – the author’s researches in the Public Record Office at Kew show that, until the Civil Service reforms of the middle of the 19th Century, the military were running, amongst other things, the Post Office and the Royal Mint.  The basic question seems to be the substitution of the Governmental military by non-state actors where the latter can do at least as good a job as the former – and perhaps more cheaply and with less bureaucratic overhead.

To judge by the sentiments and proposals explained in these Paragraphs, the way forward would be to encourage the existing network of PMCs to carry out, for example, Customs & Excise, medical and infrastructure projects while the NGF carry out the bulk of the ‘protection’ tasks.  This would also minimise the need for PMC personnel to carry other than the most basic of self-defence weaponry.

The number of such humanitarian and presumably (relatively!) peaceful tasks is clearly considerable, implying that the size of the Non-Governmental ‘PMC Protection’ force would be equal to a significant fraction of current national military strength.

Options For Regulation

The key points in this are covered in Paragraphs 103, 108 and 114.  Paragraph 103 re-iterates the need for a rigorous licensing regime, with the main objectives of preventing human rights violations.  

Paragraph 108 recommends that the existing network of PMCs be expressly prohibited from participation in armed combat operations, and that firearms be only carried and used expressly for self-defence and training purposes.  This leaves open the questions of protection and (in emergency) extraction, which would probably form the main tasks of any Non-Governmental Forces organisation

Paragraph 114 reinforces this concept, calling for a ban on recruitment for combat operations by PMCs, and a further ban on recruitment by offshore/overseas PMCs for such operations.  The institution of a NGF organisation that, so to speak, turns the wolves into guard dogs, would appear to answer these points.

Re-employment of Former Armed Forces Personnel

This is the ‘kernel’ of what the author would call the Non-Governmental Forces concept.  Paragraph 139 of the Report notes that there is a continuing demand for a range of military and security services, from foreign governments, commercial enterprises, other agencies working in conflict and HM Government.

Paragraphs 140 and 141 of the Report introduce the concept of a publicly-funded cadre of former Service personnel, who would be familiar with British service discipline, and with working with the Armed Forces Act.  This cadre would be acting under the auspices of HM Government.
NGF Organisation & Structure

The Committee clearly recognises that there are detailed problems of structure, financing and organisation that would have to be carefully considered.  The author, having studied the Report at considerable length, and done considerable background research using what he understands to be the standard reference works, would like to take this opportunity to suggest some solutions to the Committee’s points.

Let us begin with organisation and structure.  There are repeated references to proper military organisation, with a full command-and-control structure, body of military law, Oath of Allegiance, etc.  

On the other hand, the missions outlined appear to have a heavy ‘Army’ emphasis, with no explicit ‘Air Force’ or ‘Navy’ commitments.  What appears to be implied is the Non-Governmental Forces being chiefly a ‘ground force’ operation, with Naval and Air components being strictly subordinate to this.  Some sort of unified structure/organisation appears to be indicated, as operated by the Canadian Forces, and suggested by Col. David H. Hackworth in his book ‘About Face’.

The other key elements are recruiting and finance.  The Committee considers the idea of recruiting retired ex-military personnel.  The size of the force implied by the Evidence & Findings of the Report appears to be much greater than could be formed by a permanent body of such personnel, leading to the conclusion that direct recruitment from British society would be necessary, along with the recruitment of suitable-qualified foreign nationals – over and above the permanent UN military contingent mentioned earlier.
Recruitment Categories

The following categories of experienced personnel and direct entrants suggest themselves:-

•	Experienced British military personnel who have successfully completed an extended term of service, and who wish to apply their expertise to the non-governmental sector.

•	Experienced British military personnel who have, in effect, left the Services in disgust at the blunders and abuses which appear to characterise the Governmental defence effort.  These individuals should be given an opportunity to pursue their military careers in a more congenial and productive environment.

•	Special Forces selection procedure.  There must exist a significant number of failed candidates who are greatly superior to the average “squaddie”, but are nonetheless not quite what a SAS/SBS operative should be.  These individuals should be given an opportunity to apply their skills in the non-governmental sector without going through the upheaval of leaving the Services.

•	Secondments from what is semi-officially admitted to be an overstaffed Governmental military hierarchy.  It is the author’s contention that the MoD has seen the NGF concept coming, and has ‘stockpiled’, as it were, suitably qualified personnel.

•	British citizens who are, as it were, loyal to humanitarian, Western and UN principles, but not to the British nation-state, or one of Britain’s constituent nationalities.  This is one of the less-well publicised consequences of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) phenomenon.

•	British citizens who have been alienated by the blunders and abuses which appear to characterise the Governmental sector – but who wish to serve in a more congenial and productive environment.

•	Asylum Seekers.  The holding centres must be full of young adult males whose intelligence and motivation (and often educational accomplishment) are on an unusually high order.  These gentlemen should be given a chance to earn their place in British society.
•	Suitably-qualified individuals from other EU, NATO and overseas (there is already a plan for the Commonwealth) countries, each case to be decided on its individual merits.
Finance

Practical politics dictate that no immediate call on the Exchequer be made; i.e., non-governmental sources of finance must be found.  As this commentary is written, this appears to be perfectly feasible.

One of the less-well publicised aspects of the current Stock Market uproar is that the effective yield on Government Bonds with a maturity date of up to ten years from date of issue is in the range of 2-4%.  It is therefore conceivable that an issue of  Non-Governmental Forces Bonds giving a rate of 5%, using the same business rules, would allow access to the international capital markets.

The problem is providing the necessary degree of ‘solidity’.  The Report implies that a guaranteed income stream from the UK Foreign Aid Budget, Relief Charities, PMCs and the UN.  However, the money markets will regard this as insufficient – the phrase most commonly used is ‘moral hazard’ (in other words, do not trust the politicians!).
Again, a solution suggests itself.  In amongst all the fuss about companies and “fat cats” evading their taxes, is a solitary grain of truth : HM Government lets approximately £85 Billion in tax go uncollected each year.  While this is a distinct improvement on the 1996 Deloitte & Touche estimate of £96 Billion, particularly in real terms, this is till a large sum.  This merits an investigation as to why this is so – with the intention of holding, say, 5% of this sum (£4250 Million a year) in an interest-bearing Bank Account to underwrite the Bond issue.
Arms Exports

Paragraphs 142 to 150 inclusive deal with the brokering and trafficking in arms.  One immediate possibility presented by any Non-Governmental Forces Act and related PMC regulations is simply to insert clauses, verifiable by a permanent body of inspectors (perhaps the same group to monitor PMCs?), closing this sort of thing down completely and permanently.
More subtly, a large and flourishing NGF/PMC sector would provide the economics of scale and enhanced overseas influence that are the normal arguments behind the arms export policies of the last thirty years – thereby garnering significant Liberal-Left support.
Monitoring & Evaluation

This is covered by Paragraphs 151 to 157 inclusive of the Report.  The main bone of contention concerns the recommendation of an informal appraisal and complaints mechanism.  This, in the author’s opinion, contradicts sentiments and recommendations expressed elsewhere in the Report.

The appraisal and complaints mechanism should be full and formal, being instituted by the appropriate clauses in any Non-Governmental Forces Act, with consultations between UK officials in post and organisations operating alongside PMCs in the field being formally recorded and legally valid.

The Committee is quite right to recommend than an evaluation and monitoring scheme be made part of any NGF/PMC regulatory system, and that full co-operation with that regime be a condition of any Licence issued to a PMC (Paragraph 157).

The issue of Parliamentary scrutiny is dealt with in Paragraphs 158 to 160 inclusive of the Report.  Rather then have individual Parliamentary scrutiny of each PMC Licence, any Non-Governmental Forces Act should provide for scrutiny by a permanent PMC regulatory body, with arguments and redress being pursued through the courts.

Weighing the costs and benefits of regulation is dealt with in Paragraphs 161 to 163 inclusive of the Report.  The bone of contention is the recommendation in Paragraph 163 that a cost-benefit analysis be done on establishing a regulatory regime for e “private” (i.e., both NGF and PMC) military sector within the UK.  It is the author’s contention that the costs, in terms of politics, economics, loss of life and limb, and potential conflict with other countries, of a series of (or even one major) “private” military operations going wrong through lack of regulation and legal controls, far outweighs the costs of setting up such regulations and controls.

This ends the commentary on the Report itself.  Consideration will now be given to the large body of evidence submitted to and recorded by the Committee.

Commentary on Minutes of Evidence Recorded by the Committee
Non-Governmental Forces & International Operations

This is dealt with on Page Ev3 of the Minutes.  This links up with the concept of the UN Standing Contingent referred to earlier,  The advantages would be as follows:-

Speed of reaction/deployment
Professional competence
Cost
Commonality of equipment, training and doctrine
Command/Communications/Control/Intelligence, force motivation and direction would be all the easier  and more effective
Size related to effectiveness
No need to “canvass” for contributing nations
Greatly lessened sensitivity about casualties from contributing nations

The roles of both NGF and PMCs would be clearly defined in a UN Charter and could include:-

Peace enforcement
Rapid crisis response – allowing a larger Governmental force to be organised and deployed
Crisis Prevention – either by intelligence preparation, forceful diplomacy or, if all else fails, by “striking at the head”
Separation of warring factions
Refugee protection and management
Logistics
Security of humanitarian assistance
Intelligence & psychological operations
Combat and civil engineering tasks

Similar principles would apply to services supplied to HM Government, humanitarian organisations, and existing PMCs who find themselves “in over their heads”, as it were.

There is a reference on Page Ev21 of the Minutes, stating that the existing HM Government armed forces “are neither intended to carry out long-running nation-building operations, nor are they likely to have spare capacity to take on such tasks in the foreseeable future”.

The use of PMCs, backed up where necessary by NGF, will answer this question.
Assumptions

These are also dealt with on Pages Ev21 and Ev22 of the Minutes and comprise the following:-

•	It will be more cost-effective to outsource certain security functions that to provide these functions from within standing national armed forces.

•	In a world where effective government in may states is weak and collapsing, there will be demands on major powers and international bodies to respond to issues of governance and security.  There is therefore likely to be an increasing demand from both international bodies and legitimate governments to guarantee security in their areas of responsibility.  Various types of technical assistance, logistical, operational and training tasks are likely to be amongst these requirements.

•	The trend towards the diminishing of the share of government in national economies, particularly in the West, suggests that outsourcing for the provision of services is likely to increase.

•	There is no spare capacity in the Governmental Armed Forces to take on additional long-term security tasks that contribute to nation-building (ISAF & KFOR for example) nor are they likely to be in the foreseeable future.

•	The activities of the current crop of PMCs may adversely affect the long-term political and economic development of the countries they operate in if they become too large.

•	It is vital that the respective roles of the NGF and PMCs are clearly and enforceably defined to facilitate the successful operation of both.

•	Proper and rigorous oversight.

•	Both PMCs and the NGF are envisaged as potential components of nation-building projects, robustly regulated and monitored by HM Government, and available to international bodies, legitimate governments and humanitarian organisations.
Regulatory Framework – Practical Recommendations

This is dealt with on Pages Ev22 and Ev23 of the Minutes. Examination of these Pages suggests the following:-

•	A Non-Governmental Forces Enabling Act putting PMCs on a proper statutory basis.

•	A central approval system

•	Regulation of individuals employed

•	licensing

•	Best Practice

•	Monitoring & Evaluation Unit

•	Monitoring in compliance with Enabling Act

•	Regulatory authorities to have full and unfettered access to information

•	Activities of Monitoring & Evaluation Unit to be encouraged
A Note on Revenue

Page Ev23 of the Minutes makes a note of the annual cost of the UN’s UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) operation – approximately $600 million a year.  Put out to tender, private military companies would do the job more cheaply and effectively.
Geneva Convention

Page Ev45 of the Minutes touches on the Geneva Convention.  Clauses within the NGF Enabling Act would be needed to cover the existence of NGF and PMCs under the convention, non-combatant PMC roles and PMC combat roles, notably self-defence.  Some attention to NGF combat roles should also be given.
Inevitability of Conflict

Dumping individuals in a war zone means that they will have to fight, if only to defend themselves, therefore the prohibition on “combat services” mentioned on Page Ev34 of the Minutes is simply impracticable.

However, what is perfectly feasible is to confine PMCs strictly to self-defence, and make “serious” combat one of the primary functions of the NGF.
Justification for NGF and Regulated PMCs

There are three key references to this on Pages Ev49 and Ev50 of the Minutes.  These are:-

•	Administrative and other nationally provided support in peacekeeping operations is inadequate.

•	The Governmental Forces lacked logistic and administrative support, which is bound to affect their ability to sustain peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world over any length of time.

•	It is agreed that not only is there a need for the private sector to provide what ‘national’ military contingents cannot, but that liaison with the private sector was an essential part of any command-and-control machinery.

Left-Wing Opposition

One of the obvious risks in steering any Non-Governmental Forces Act through Parliament is “left-wing” opposition.  Pages Ev51, Ev52 and Ev53 of the Minutes deal with a submission by ‘Campaign Against The Arms Trade’, an excellent example of such an organisation.  Such objections include:-

•	It would be a retrograde step to licence, and thereby condone, the used or armed force by bodies other than publicly accountable military, security and police forces

•	If the international community feels support [to weak but legitimate] governments is necessary, it should find the political will to provide assistance, either nationally or internationally.  It should not devolve the responsibility to unacceptable private companies.

•	Sales of military equipment can often cause instability and conflict, and are certainly no part of any solution.  Furthermore, where there is instability, legitimate business opportunities cannot be realised.

•	An over-reliance on coercive means of security will rarely provide long-term solutions.  The easy availability of such means through private companies might represent a temptation for states who do not wish to face the more difficult long-term challenges of creating inclusive and pluralistic political communities.

•	The use of mercenaries would reinforce the idea that military solutions can resolve conflict.

•	Democracy, peace and justice would be better served if the resources would be better served if the resources which would otherwise be used by HM Government to control or licence mercenary activities are used to give positive support or to impose sanctions on troubled states or regions.  Support could include negotiating political solutions, development aid and assistance to establish independent media, whilst sanctions would include arms embargoes.

•	Tighter controls on all arms, arms brokers and conflict goods could also do much to lessen the demand for mercenaries

The author feels that the minimum the Political Left would accept would, after due process of Parliamentary negotiation, be:-

•	All dealings between government departments and agencies and PMCs, other then operational details, to be in the public domain.

•	Any contract entered into between a PMC and a foreign government to stipulate a cash fee and no other benefit.  No other business sharing directors with the providers of security should be allowed to have any dealings with the foreign government concerned for a period of, say, five years.  The ownership of PMCs to be made transparent.

•	The PMCs in question be made responsible under British Law for any breaches of human rights or the laws of war that may be committed by employees.

The author considers that these demands are acceptable, and should be incorporated into any Non-Governmental Forces Act.

The problem occurs with the perception that many ‘Politically Left’ individuals tend to make Utopian demands and simply fail to recognise the need to negotiation.  The attitude is going to lead to considerable extension of the amount of time needed for the Non-Governmental Forces Act to progress through Parliament.  The author can only suggest that the matter be placed in the hands of the relevant Party Whips’ Offices.
The Threat

This is dealt with on Page EV55 of the Minutes.  At first glance, the first half of the top paragraph is a classic “The Russians are Coming” panic.  Unfortunately, on this occasion, bearing in mind the  economic “stitch-up” perpetrated on Russia by the Western Powers circa 1998/9, the Russians are indeed Coming.  To be more specific, able, committed and highly trained individuals appear to be quite willing to participate in, or perhaps even initiate, attacks on Western interests as a means of revenge.

On top of this, there are the large number of former guerrillas (many trained by the Cold War powers) who have enlisted with organised crime rings, giving such bodies, perhaps for the first time, a serious military capability.

Furthermore, there are the international narcotics organisations, particularly in Asia and Latin America.  The author has felt for a long time that there is a strong element of “in order to control totally, one must control totally” in this issue.  In other words, international narcotics, far from being used to subvert the West, are being used to support it.  Again, this adds to a significant military capability.

The aggregate “non-state threat” appears to be equal in size, and superior in military capability, to all but the top half-dozen world military powers.  Where does this leave the current network of PMCs?  In over their heads!

To be more specific, PMCs, as they currently exist, are capable of rising to meet this military threat, but they would have to grow in size and capability to the point where the British Government in particular would be in something of a panic, to judge by the sentiments expressed in the Report.

Clearly, the threat posed by uncontrolled non-state actors to the UN, humanitarian organisations and British interests, not to mention small specialised PMCs, must be deterred and, if necessary, defeated.  Practical politics alone appears to demand a NGF organisation sanctioned by Act of Parliament, underwritten by public funds and fielding a level of military capability commonly associated with wealthy “First World” nation-states.
National Regulatory Options

These are summarised within Paragraphs 23 to 26 inclusive on Page Ev59 of the Minutes.

Specific mention is made to licensing the Company, licensing the capabilities and licensing the Individual Contract.  Clauses enabling these procedures should be incorporated into any proposed Non-Governmental Forces Act.

These distinct regulatory steps should be applied to PMCs as they currently exist; i.e., relatively small organisations formed to carry out individual tasks or categories of service.

licensing of the NGF should be halfway between these steps and the statutory authorisation of the Governmental military.
More Regulatory Background

It is becoming increasingly obvious that at least the more responsible sort of politician (bottom of page Ev79 of the Minutes) that “privatisation is getting closer to the front line to the extent that the military’s monopoly of the fighting is over”.

Under the sort of licensing Scheme being contemplated by the Report, only companies with a Licence would be able to bid for contracts abroad.  HM Government would have to draw up a list of activities severe enough to require a Licence.  Constant appraisal of this list would then be necessary to ensure it remained up-to-date with new developments in the field.  However, the following are obvious candidates:-

Combat Support & Training
Actual Combat
Peacekeeping
Peace Enforcement
Mine Clearance
Logistical Support

Despite what some might think, PMCs in a recognisably modern form have been around since the 1930s : British participation in the 1932-5 Gran Chaco conflict and the manning of two destroyers bought by the Colombian government after the 1934 Leticia conflict are good examples.

According to Page Ev85 of the Minutes, the current crop of PMCs largely approve of regulation, as this enhances their reputations.  However, they are unhappy with the current specific implementation, citing lack of necessity, slowness, lack of confidentiality and uncompetitiveness as the causes.  Clearly, any NGF proposal must answer these questions.  Other clauses would include a Code of Conduct and the applicability of British extra-territorial legislation.  Steps must also be taken to satisfy the reservations expressed by other Departments of HM Government.
Methodology

The relevant passages are set out in paragraphs 1.6.2 and 1.6.3 of Page Ev90 of the Minutes and Paragraph 1.6.4 of Page Ev91 of the Minutes.

The main objectives are to incorporate the best practice of the Governmental military, humanitarian organisations and other HM Government Departments, notably the FCO and DFID – although not perhaps the MoD.  The objective of this is to answer the questions posed by organisations that operate on an international basis.

This is not “woolly liberalism”!  The UN, humanitarian organisations and HM Government must be regarded as potential clients for both PMCs and the NGF, and accommodating their suggestions will lead to enhanced business opportunities.
Requirements of the United Nations
These have been summarised in the Brahimi Report, as quoted on Pages Ev100, Ev101 and Ev102 of 
the Minutes, and may be summarised as follows:-

Integrated Conflict Prevention
Peace Building Strategies
Clear, Credible and Achievable Mandates
United Nations Capability to Deploy Operations Rapidly And Effectively
Intelligence Gathering, Analysis & Strategic Planning Capabilities

The revenue objections by impoverished member states would be met by the UN Standing Military Contingent mentioned earlier.

Such operations would be carried out on the basis of the Van Brabant Security Model, as now widely used by humanitarian organisations.
Requirements of Humanitarian Organisations

These, and the related background, are set down in detail within Paragraph 4.3 of Pages Ev108 and Ev109 of the Minutes.

There is a clear process of escalation proposed:-

Hiring Indigenous Help, leading to:-
Using Indigenous Police/Military, leading to:-
Hiring “small” UK PMC, leading to:-
Hiring UK NGF

These operations would also be carried out according to the Van Brabant Security Model
Requirements of HM Government Departments

These, and a full exposition of the proposed relationship between HM Government and PMCs, and presumably the NGF, is to be found within Pages Ev112 and Ev115 inclusive of the Minutes.

These potential requirements may be summarised as:-

Arms Control
Non-Proliferation
Confidence Building Measures
Stability in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Military Assistance outside Eastern Europe and Central Asia
	Department For International Development (DFID) Military Advisory Team
Potential Business Opportunities for consultancy and Professional Services firms

The Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on Private Military Companies has turned out, in the author’s opinion, to be a much more wide-ranging and well-researched document than expected.

A vast amount of expertise and sheer hard work has gone into the Report and the Committee is perhaps not fully aware of the possibilities contained within it.

As this is written, the Government White Paper has yet to be published, and the drafting of the Parliamentary Bill must be at an early stage, if it has started at all.

Interested firms, and their Partners, therefore appear to be in a position to mould Government policy to fit the partnership’s Project Management/SI/Consultancy offerings.

Regarding competition, following the recent take-over of  EDS, only IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Accenture are in a position to seriously compete with such a partnership.

The basic idea behind the potential opportunities stated is to concentrate on the Non-Governmental Forces (NGF) concept implicit within the Report.  The current crop of Private Military Companies (PMCs) are intended to be regarded as potential customers and business partners rather then competitors.
Customer Base
HM Government Departments : Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
Department for International Development (DFID)
Private Military Companies, initially in the UK, but eventually overseas
United Nations
Humanitarian Organisations, such as the major charities
Other organisations operating on an international basis, such as oil and mineral companies
Roles
Logistics
Intelligence
Protection (including protected evacuation)
Command, Communications & Control
Specialist information, such as supplying ordnance data to de-mining/ordnance disposal charities
Psychological Operations
Combat & Civil Engineering
A Case Study in Basing & Procurement

As good a place to indicate possible opportunities would be to outline a basic Case Study of the “publicly funded cadre” referred to in the Report.

The author will use aviation as the Case Study, simply because of the wide availability of information on military aviation in the British aeronautical press.

One other thing should be considered.  A recent (2002) HoC Public Accounts Committee Report alleges that the MoD is spending approximately £870 Million a year on ‘surplus’ equipment.  It is the author’s contention that the MoD is well aware of the NGF concept and has in fact been storing potentially useful equipment.
Bases

This will be of particular interest to potential property partners.

There have been rumours in the British aeronautical press that the RAF bases at St. Mawgan in Cornwall and Lyneham in Wiltshire are being considered for closure.  It is the author’s contention that these bases are in fact being audited for non-governmental use.

Even a ‘cadre’ Non-Governmental Air Arm will require more than two bases.  The first candidate is Elvington on Yorkshire, used by the RAF as something called a Relief Landing Ground.  A form of advertisement appears some years ago in the aeronautical press referring to a 9.800 foot runway and hard-standing for 72 light bombers – the result of an abortive USAF development in the 1950s.  The author is well aware that there is a large resident museum and “general aviation” usage, but the amount of vacant space should be considerable and should be audited.

The second candidate is the RAF training base at Church Fenton, also in Yorkshire.  This was used by a large fleet (72, if memory serves correctly) of RAF basic training aircraft until the post-Cold War rundown.  More recent use has been by the Yorkshire Universities Air Squadron, which, even with current expansion plans, will still operate a much smaller fleet of physically smaller aircraft.  Therefore should therefore be a sizeable amount of unused space at this base.

The third candidate is the Army Air Corps base at Dishforth, again in Yorkshire.  Some years ago, the author managed a brief look at the CAA Private Pilots’ Guide, this establishment being shown as having two full-length runways, and the implication is, given the public-quoted number of Army Air Corps helicopters, only half the total available area of the base is currently being used.  Again, audit accordingly.

The fourth candidate is the RAF base at Leconfield, also in Yorkshire.  This establishment housed two RAF Lightning interceptor squadrons until the late 1960s, so the potential at least of extensive runways and hard standings exists.  RAF Leconfield currently houses a RAF Search & rescue helicopter flight, and the author is not aware of any extensive industrial or other civil development at this site.
Further candidates include North Coates (near Grimsby) and Binbrook (Lincolnshire), although these sites seem to be the site of some civil aviation development.

Should further sites be investigated, it would be a good practice to commission the Yorkshire economic development bodies to carry out detailed investigations.  Interestingly, the Aerospace Industry Steering Group already includes regional organisations.
Procurement

The Committee is already thinking in terns of a publicly-funded cadre, which would best used to back-up existing PMCs, and conduct those operations which are too large, complicated and, quite frankly, too dangerous for the latter.

Staying with the theme of aviation as a Case Study, the South African Government has implemented a “cadre Air Force”, apparently dedicated to similar missions to those outlined in the Report.  The author here takes the liberty of using the stated strength of this organisation, as stated in the British aeronautical press, and modifying it in the light of publicly-quoted British deficiencies.  This gives the following figures:-

Basic/Advanced Trainer 	: 52
Medium Helicopter 	: 44 (or equivalent)
Light Helicopter 		: 40 (or equivalent)
Tactical Fighter 		: 32
Jet Trainer/LIFT 		: 24
Light Observation 	: 20
Helicopter Gunship 	: 24
Medium Transport 	: 8
Heavy Transport 		: 10 Hercules Equivalent
Light Transport 		: 8 (also doubles as multi-engine and navigation trainer)
Maritime Helicopter 	: 12
Maritime Patrol 		: 5
VIP 			: 4
EW/SIGINT 		: 2
Tanker 			: 5
Command & Control 	: 1

Although the author is not primarily interested in aviation, military or otherwise, the amount of good-quality used surplus equipment that is available, and the public offerings of the manufacturers, is nonetheless most impressive.  Some outline ideas on sources of equipment will therefore be given.

Although acquiring used equipment for building up the “front line” organisation could be quite adequate, safety considerations in particular dictate that ‘new’ equipment of the highest quality must be purchased for training purposes.

One obvious choice for the basic/advanced training role is the Pilatus PC21.  This firm has gone to a lot of trouble and expense in designing an aircraft that, by selecting the appropriate ‘switches’ on the flight control system can be used for both ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ training.

The BAE Systems Hawk seems to be the current industry standard for the jet and Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT).  Discussing this with BAE Systems, who are trying to keep the production line ‘ticking over’ pending further orders, it ought to be possible to secure particularly advantageous terms for the procurement of 24 of these aircraft.

The apparent industry standard for light transports appears to be the CN235.  Eight of these aircraft would, if fitted with the appropriate palletised equipment, fulfil the roles of multi-engined and navigation trainer as well as light transport.

National agencies have gone to a lot of trouble establishing the Defence Helicopter Flying School (DHFS).  It would avoid the time, trouble and expense of ‘re-inventing the wheel’ if the NGF training organisation simply ‘buys in’ to the DHFS, including purchases of extra training helicopters.

The author has the impression that the business case for establishing a large-scale fixed-wing flying training ‘academy’ is very strong, as not only NGF and UN candidates would be trained, but a significant number of Governmental candidates would present themselves, particularly in view of national government’s inability to decide in this area.

The question of transport helicopters will now be considered.  In 1993, a PMC-style plan was put forward to dedicate recovered Westland-30 and ex-South African Puma helicopters to improving RAF capability in this area.  Re-examination of this plan represents one obvious way forward.

It appears that a considerable number of Westland-30s were indeed recovered from India before the scheme in question was dropped, and that these aircraft remain in storage.  It would be interesting to know if the Airspur (US) examples exist, and where they are currently stored.  Even if these examples were never returned to the UK, from what is known about the American attitude to surplus (but potentially useful) machinery, the chances of these helicopters still being in existence in a salvageable condition is very high.  The basic idea is to produce an equivalent ‘seating capacity’ to the 40 light helicopters the South Africans consider necessary

Regarding ‘medium’ helicopters, rather than stick to the original plan, how about the 14 South African Super Frelons?  The NGF, not being bound my MoD diktat, would be in a position to purchase these machines, which were extensively overhauled (including a process known as “re-skinning”) shortly before being retired.  In these aircraft do not provide an equivalent seating capacity to 44 Super Puma/ Oryx, then by all means make up the difference with Pumas.

However, it should be borne mind that these ‘used’ medium helicopters would have to be replaced within a few years of what promises to be very hard use.  Immediate consideration should therefore be given to replacing them with new- state-of-the-art transport helicopters of equivalent seating capacity.  Twenty-Six EH101s would be one option.

Procuring tactical fighters will prove something of a problem.  For example, take the Eurofighter.  National Government appears to be trying to 'weasel out' of their production commitments, as well as Eurofighter GmbH being able to offer production 'slots' without producing existing commitments.  The problem is the politics : the other collaborative partners will object, as anything in the military sphere not strictly confined to national or European self-defence has, to say the least, highly unfortunate connotations.  The same argument applies to weapon procurement, particularly to the Meteor air-to-air missile.

The same arguments appear to apply to the SAAB Gripen.  According to published figures, the Swedish government currently have 40 Batch 1 & 2 Gripens available.  Twenty-six of these aircraft, accompanied by six new-build two-seaters, would satisfy the requirement.  However, the Swedes take their neutrality extremely seriously, and will probably refuse to supply both aircraft and associated weapons.

A more promising prospect is the F-16E/F (aka the Block 60).  The Government of the United Arab Emirates (who are funding this project) have placed the project on a fully commercial basis, which appears to minimise, and perhaps eliminate, political interference.  Interestingly, the precision guided weapons to be used by this aircraft are of British design and manufacture, although funded by the UAE, and the manufacturer is able to sell these designs to other customers.

The world market is awash with used tactical fighters in sound condition, and even a basic description would be an article in itself, so we will terminate this matter at this point.

Light observation helicopters could, initially at least, be purchased from the national stockpile.  The author understands that the entire UK fleet of Gazelle HT2s is currently in storage – another case pf stockpiling?  Give Westlands the job of turning these aircraft into something useful.

The industry standard for ‘heavy’ transports is the C-130 Hercules.  The obvious candidate for most of  the requirement is the eight embargoed Libyan examples sitting in Lockheed-Martin’s backyard since 1973(!!).  Leasing these aircraft, rather than buying them, ought to satisfy the terms of the Congressional mandate.  The same appears to apply to the three embargoed Yugoslav aircraft, and there also appears to be a thriving secondhand market in Hercules as a backup option.  While the aircraft are being overhauled, upgrading the avionics and fitting in-flight refuelling would be useful.

Two replacement paths suggest themselves.  The first is to replace the first-generation Hercules with C-130Js.  The second is to replace with 5 or 6 A400Ms.  Airbus ought to be able to make production 'slots' available, as they no doubt wish to build up the production run.

Regarding the medium transport requirement, two candidates suggest themselves : the C27J and the CASA C295  This would require a competitive evaluation of the nature now widely practiced by the world's air forces.

Twelve maritime helicopters would be required to equip the six destroyers/frigates that national government appears to wish to ‘hire’ from non-governmental sources.  Sea Kings purchased from the national stockpile would be a suitable initial choice, to be replaced by ‘naval’ Merlins at a later date.

Considering maritime aircraft, how about Nimrod MRA4s?  Three airframes are already potentially available, due to a reduced national requirement.

The obvious alternative would be refurbished Orions, perhaps by selecting five suitable airframes from The US AMARC storage organisation .

A possibly cheaper option, to be examined in the case of investor objections, would be the CASA C295MPA with a Thales mission system.  This would be a ‘new’ development, and may therefore be more expensive that off-the-shelf Nimrods or Orions.

The final type of weapons-carrying aircraft to be considered is the helicopter gunship. However, the South African Rooivalk comes into the picture.  This aircraft, publicly at least, does not suffer from firing weapons damaging the airframe(!!!).  What is often goes unremarked about South African military hardware is that these systems have been produced to requirements based on combat in conditions similar to those likely to be faced by the NGF.  Therefore, the author would, given the opportunity, recommend that 24 Rooivalks be purchased.

With recent increases in the number of British political leaders who might actually be doing a proper job, particularly at a regional level, good PR dictates an appreciable VIP fleet.  Top of the list comes the one-and-only Airbus A340-6000, as ordered by Prince Jefri of Brunei, completed but never fitted out, and apparently still in storage somewhere!  Regarding fitting-out, simply draw up a specification and hold a competition in the usual way.  Good Euro-PR dictates staying with Airbus, so how about an A319CJ?

A couple of the latest Dassault business jets would complete the quartet.  The author realises that this is all politics, but the ‘EU Lobby’ could make things very difficult, but they must be placated!

It is apparently customary for EW/SIGINT, Tanker and C&C aircraft to be converted from airliners.  However, readers may find the author’s suggestion somewhat unusual – Douglas DC-8s powered by Rolls-Royce Conway engines.  The main reason for this choice is that the DC-8 has found a major niche as a cargo aircraft, which means that airframe-related spares are likely to be available for much longer than the Boeing 707, which is rapidly reaching the end of its commercial life.  The Conway-engined variant seems to have been used as a species of aeronautical yacht, which means that these aircraft will have been flown and maintained more carefully, yet are easily available, as they are too non-standard to be useful to cargo operators, or even to be worth breaking-up for parts.

It publicly appears that the Rolls-Royce Conway engine will be supported by Rolls-Royce until at least 20015.  Replacement, perhaps by the BR715, should be studied with an eye to the wider market.

The EW/SIGINT aircraft would be filled with off-the-shelf equipment, with an emphasis on air-to-ground surveillance.

For the tankers, hose-drum units, tanks, pumps, valves and control gear would be those items recently recovered from retired VC10s.  Some spare Conway engines could come from the same source.

The author has refrained until now from mentioning unmanned air vehicles.  This is quite deliberate.  It has been recently officially admitted that UAVs have a loss rate between ten times and a hundred times that of manned aircraft – no doubt because UAVs fly a mathematically-predictable flight path.

The implication is that the surveillance ‘job’ is not being done, which places more lives at greater risk than the use of manned aircraft would.  It is very interesting to note that this nay have been realised, and that the Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE) concept is being developed, to counter this problem.

The author, given the opportunity, would recommend that the NGF development an AMSTE capability, built around stand-off electronic surveillance aircraft (the EW/SIGINT DC-8s mentioned above) and tactical fighters carrying electro-optical imaging and database pods.
A Takeover Bid

The RAF’s fleet of Canberra aircraft (used for photographic intelligence gathering and surveys) – all seven of them – seems at one point to have, quite literally, been forgotten by the MoD planners (!!!!).  As can be appreciated, this resulted in a ‘bureaucratic bunfight’ of considerable proportions (with its attendant costs) and a senior RAF officer travelling to India in a forlorn attempt to obtain spare parts from the Indian Air Force.

This impresses the author as ludicrous, demeaning to all concerned and a waste of public funds.  The professional service industry could hardly do worse – and do it cheaper!

The key capability here is the five model PR9 aircraft (the other two are trainers), which as all plane spotters know, has a performance equal to the famous U-2.  The opportunity here is to get together with whoever is the ‘design authority’ for this aircraft these days, and mount what cab best be described as a takeover bid.  The underlying assumption is that the Canberra PR9 is not easily replaced, and a rebuild programme, despite the design’s advanced age, is the best way forward.

Regarding overstretch issue, according to the author’s calculations, at least two, and possibly as many as five, other Canberra PR9s are still in existence and in a recoverable condition.  If this is still not enough, and attempt should be made to recover the Venezuelan ‘export’ aircraft.

The rationale behind this is that these examples appear to be the very last Canberras rebuilt – the final examples being completed as recently as 1986.  It appears that fourteen aircraft survived to be retired in 1992.  What happened afterwards is unclear but they were not scrapped or ‘put out to pasture’.  The most likely fate is that they were bought by the US warbird fraternity and are currently sitting in sheds in the US somewhere.

If this option is pursued, it may prove beneficial to inquire of the Peruvian Government as to what they have left and obtain details of the South African avionics upgrade.

This story is simply the author’s favourite amongst a series of such incidents.  Another example worth of consideration is to take over the original six RAF Tristar tankers when (if) the FSTA gets going, which only served three years in airline service, and are likely to have a worthwhile amount of ‘fatigue life’ left.
Another example comes from reading between the lines over all the fuss about the Eurofighter.  Basically, this amounts to an implicit invitation to take over the RAF’s Jaguar fleet, together with their base at Coltishall in Norfolk.

Finally, there is a deal which involves BAE Systems.  It appears that the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain wish to ‘trade in’ their fleets of Northrop F-5s against Hawks and Eurofighters respectively.  This would leave BAES with about 100 F-5s in a saturated used fighter market.  There are any number of avionics upgrades about, and one assumes a supply of spare parts.  The problem would be ‘selling’ the capability to a confused and horrified British government.
Allotting Bases

If (and it is a big if!) the NGF concept gets the go-ahead, the allotting of groups of aircraft to particular bases will have to be addressed.  The author suggest the following:-

Dishforth – medium helicopters
Leconfield – gunships & observation helicopters
Chuch Fenton – basic/advanced trainers
Elvington – tactical fighters/LIFT
Lyneham – transports (including multi-engine trainers)
St. Mawgan – everything else!
Engineering

This is the easy bit - talk to BAE Systems, Marshalls, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon and Boeing.
Base Protection

Where NGF/PMC deployments occur in active war zones, a base protection force similar to the RAF Regiment will be required.  What exactly this would involve would require examination by those with the appropriate experience.
Risks

The following risks are potential showstoppers, the mitigation of which would require special attention by those able to deal with such matters.

•	Politics.  For anyone other than national government to possess an effective military capability is clearly a very ‘touchy’ subject.  Therefore, despite the sentiments expressed in the Report, the Westminster leadership may simply refuse to go ahead with the NGF concept.

•	Money.  If national government really has lost the plot over tax, it may not be possible to underwrite the Bond issue.

•	Recruitment.  Experienced personnel, when approached, may not be prepared to serve within the NGF.  However, the major grievances have been widely covered, and it appears that there is very little that a sensible benefits package and ready supply of consumable items would not fix.  More seriously, prejudice against all forms and figures of authority in British society may have progressed to the point where is it simply not possible to recruit candidates of the required standard from within British society.  Also, the Westminster leadership may object to the recruitment of foreign nationals.

•	Bases.  The national MoD may not make facilities available (and the politicians may not have the authority to force it) and the planning system may inflict unacceptable delays.

•	Europe.  A variety of European governments are likely to object to Britain implementing the NGF project for a variety of reasons.  Whether or not they could get the whole thing stopped is unclear, but there is a real prospect of provoking a political ‘panic’ at Westminster, with all the delay and aggravation that entails.

The author suggests mounting a pre-emptive strike, and engineering a complete ban on NGF deployments through the European Union, accompanied by an explicit restriction of recruitment/training/ procurement/administrative activities to mainland Britain – this should deal with any Irish objections.

The following opportunities appear to present themselves:-
•	Increase the size of the NGF until the required Governmental military resources are freed-up.

•	Get the prohibition on sub-state actors rescinded.  The author recommends that the Welsh be used as a test case in this instance (on grounds of initiative and professionalism) rather than the Scots.

•	Raise a British Foreign Legion

The second and third of these options would be funded by the £870 Million a year that the MoD currently spends on ‘potentially useful’ equipment.
Marine Branch

Interestingly, there appears to have been at least one recent previous attempt to harness the PMC concept on a large scale, namely the 1992 scheme for the ’privatisation the RN’s Fisheries Protection function.

Also, the NGF will require sealift as well as airlift.

Therefore, Naval matters will be briefly dealt with at this point.

Regarding major sealift vessels, the ability to avoid being subject to MoD diktat (one hopes!) will allow two large amphibious transport vessels of the most suitable type to be built.

This done, at least a basic degree of AAW/ASW protection will be required.  As well as arming the amphibious vessels, the concept of six non-governmental destroyers/frigates appears to be under consideration.

A suitable number (10?) of what are called Multi-Purpose Vessels should be procured.  The idea here is to build a basic 'ship' with provision for modules of a standard size and service connection configuration that cover the roles of, for example, mine countermeasures, hydrographic survey, resource protection, pollution control and diving support.

Also, replenishment ships and tankers would be required – two of each?

From a historical perspective, citing the Falklands conflict as an example, a properly equipped and operated non-governmental helicopter carrier would have prevented both the sinking of the SS ‘Atlantic Conveyor’ and the Bluff Cove disaster.

Sources

The full details of the Report are:-
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
Private Military Companies
Ninth Report of 2001-2002 Session
HC922
Publisher : TSO
Price : £18.50

The author has also found the following books to be a great help in understanding the themes of the Report:-

Worlds in Collision (Terror and the Future of Global Order)
Edited : K. Booth & T. Dunne
Publisher : Palgrave (Macmillan) 2002

Blowback – The Costs & Consequences of American Empire
Chalmers Johnson
Publisher : Little, Brown & Co. 2000

Virtual War – Kosovo and beyond
Michael Ignatieff
Publisher : Chatto & Windus 2000

The New Military Humanism – Lessons from Kosovo
Noam Chomsky
Publisher : Pluto Press 1999

A useful audio-visual reference is the original broadcast (NOT the post-9/11 abstraction!) of the BBC television series ‘Future War’, narrated by Michael Ignatieff.